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 ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN HARMONY
 AND CONFLICT
 The Experience in Sri Lanka
 and Malaysia
 Ameer Ali
 The recent upsurge of Islamic revivalism that has
 swept through the Muslim world has added more to the latter's problems
 than it has provided solutions to those already existing. The problems it
 created, and in fact the nature and origins of the revivalist movement
 itself, have varied from country to country depending on political, eco-
 nomic, and social conditions. This article intends to examine the shape of
 Islamic revivalism and its consequences in two countries, Sri Lanka and
 Malaysia, which offer several contrasting structural differences.
 The Environment-A Contrast
 In terms of its economic resources and per capita GNP, Sri Lanka is one
 of the poorer nations in the contemporary Third World. With tea as its
 major export, accounting for more than 50% of the export revenue;
 without any significant mineral or oil deposits; and with a total popula-
 tion of nearly 15 million people, increasing annually at the rate of about
 2%, the island's economy is in dire straits. The World Bank estimates Sri
 Lanka's per capita GNP for 1981 at $230, and according to another
 survey the country ranks 116th of 145 countries in terms of per capita
 GNP.' If the current inflation rate of 45% and the unemployment rate of
 15% are added to this gloomy picture, Sri Lanka's economic difficulties
 become clearly evident.
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 On the other hand, Malaysia is one of the richer countries in the Third
 World. With a population of nearly 14 million and a per capita GNP of
 $1370, it ranks 65th in the survey mentioned above. It has a diversified
 export sector based chiefly on rubber, palm oil, tin, timber, and petro-
 leum. The low unemployment rate of 5.3% in 1980 and its lower rate of
 inflation than Sri Lanka-23% as reflected by the consumer price index
 between 1975 and 1980-are further indications of Malaysia's com-
 parative economic strength.
 Both countries have a multiracial and multireligious society, but while
 the Muslims in Sri Lanka form only about 7% of the country's popula-
 tion, their counterparts in Malaysia add up to between 44% and 54%.2
 The religio-ethnic distribution of the Malaysian population is not clearly
 defined. The official view is that all Malays are Muslims, and since the
 latter make up about 54% of the population, it is claimed that Malaysia is
 a Muslim majority country. But in practice all Malays are not Muslims.
 There are a considerable number of animists among the Malays who can
 be called at best statistical Muslims. Nevertheless, what is important for
 our purpose is that the Muslims are a ruling community in Malaysia with
 Islam as the state religion. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Muslims are a
 subject community without any special constitutional status accorded to
 their religion. Both groups adhere to the Shafiite school of the Sunni
 sect.
 There is yet another difference between the two groups with regard to
 religion that plays a crucial role in the revivalist movement. While the
 sources of religious inspiration and influence in Malaysia come mostly
 from the Arab Middle East and neighboring Indonesia, and least of all
 from the Indian subcontinent, the order is reversed for Sri Lanka, which
 receives most of its inspiration from neighboring South India, a modicum
 from the Middle East, and none at all from Indonesia. In other words, a
 ruling religion in the Middle East and Indonesia interacts with a ruling
 religion in Malaysia, and a subject religion in India interacts with a
 subject religion in Sri Lanka. Naturally, the force of that interaction has
 to be different in the two countries.
 There is also a political difference that determines the shape of Islamic
 revivalism between the two countries. Since the Muslims in Sri Lanka are
 a minority scattered over all parts of the island, there is less possibility of
 that community organizing itself into a single political group to fight for its
 rights or for a particular share of the country's economic cake. The fact
 2. The lower figure is from Richard V. Weekes, Muslim Peoples. A World, Ethnographic
 Survey (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978). The higher figure is according to the
 Fourth Malaysian Plan, p. 74.
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 that there has been no Muslim political party in Sri Lanka illustrates this
 argument. The strategy the community has adopted so far has been to
 join hands with the majority parties to try to win concessions from
 whichever government comes to power. They live more by their privi-
 leges than by their rights. The position is reversed in Malaysia. The
 Malays, according to Mohamad Mahathir, the present Prime Minister,
 are the "definitive people," and "if citizenship is conferred on races other
 than Malays, it is because Malays consent to this. That consent is condi-
 tional."3 Thus, having established Islam as the state religion and having
 defined the Malays/Muslims as the only definitive people, one cannot
 then stop a group of Muslims from entering the political arena with the
 sole intention of shaping the society's political and economic structure on
 religious principles.
 Finally, the difference between temperament and character of the two
 groups of Muslims should not be ignored in discussing environmental
 factors. In Sri Lanka the Muslims are noted for their entrepreneurship
 and hard work, and are considered to be the most business-minded
 community in the country. Consequently, they prefer a free-market
 capitalist economy to one that is state controlled or socialistic. This
 explains their traditional support to the ruling United National Party,
 which believes in the superiority of the capitalist system and uses all its
 endeavors to implement it. In Malaysia, on the other hand, the Malays
 are considered to be less enterprising, and therefore economically re-
 tarded and far behind the other races in terms of economic achievements
 (Mahathir attributes this to the Malay ethnic trait4). This means that in a
 free enterprise system the Muslims stand to lose in Malaysia. Even
 though the Malaysian government publicly announces its commitment to
 free enterprise, in practice it adopts a mixed economic model in which an
 increasing role is reserved to the state.
 Thus the recent revivalist movements in Sri Lanka and Malaysia have
 emerged in the context of two contrasting political, economic, and
 socio-cultural environments. In the former it was a movement within a
 minority community without organized political parties, living in a poor
 economy with a strong preference for operating under a capitalist eco-
 nomic framework; whereas in the latter, it is a movement within the
 ruling community, politically organized into several groupings and living
 in a rich economy but within a state-controlled structure. These envi-
 ronmental factors play a crucial role in shaping the character of the
 revivalist movement in both countries.
 3. Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Kuala Lumpur, 1981 ed.), p. 126.
 4. Ibid., pp. 16-31.
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 The Nature of the Islamic Revivalism:
 A General Picture
 The Islamic revival that ushered in the 1970s was a combined product of
 three events of great significance: the partial victory of Egypt in the 1973
 war with Israel, the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Export-
 ing Countries (OPEC) with its Arab members forming a subgroup
 (OAPEC), and the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. All of these
 events contained in common an element of aggression. Nevertheless, the
 revivalist movement that emerged out of them developed into two
 contrasting types, the iman-centered and the umma-centered move-
 ments, each in turn taking either a radical or a moderate image depend-
 ing on the particular socio-political environment in which it operated.
 The ideal of the iman-centered movement is simply the self-
 purification of the Muslims both spiritually and temporally so as to build
 up a stronger iman or faith. According to this view, the summation of all
 purified souls will lead to a purified society. This approach to social
 change is akin to the philosophy of the Benthamites who also believed
 that the greatest happiness of the greatest number could be achieved
 through the pursuit of individual happiness. If the existing Muslim state
 is corrupt or unislamic, the way to change it is not through organized
 revolution but through a change in the character of its subjects. Once the
 people become true Muslims, Allah will cause the downfall of the cor-
 rupt.
 This philosophy of iman-centered revivalism determines the nature of
 its activities. Its followers are chiefly engaged in tabligh (missionary
 work) in which they are less interested in winning new converts to Islam
 than in making the existing members of the faith more Islamic. Instruct-
 ing the umma (community) to follow strictly the five pillars of Islam,
 teaching the young the basic principles of the religion, constructing
 mosques and establishing madrasas (Quran schools), and endeavoring to
 change the curriculum in schools to incorporate a bias towards religion
 are some of the activities of this group. They lead a simple life with little
 desire for material advancement, and their movement is essentially non-
 political in character.
 In contrast, the ideal of the umma-centered movement is not only the
 self-purification of Muslims as individuals but also the purification of the
 society as an organized unit and of its supreme organ, the state. The
 organizational transformation should go hand in hand with individual
 change rather than the other way round. According to this view, an
 inappropriate or unislamic environment is an impediment to the devel-
 opment of a strong iman. This philosophy thus leads naturally to or-
 ganized action to change the environment. Islam in the hands of this
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 group becomes a serious socioeconomic alternative to the Western and
 Marxist development strategies. The activities of the umma-centered
 group turn out to be political in nature, and they do not necessarily
 confine themselves to peaceful changes through parliamentary tactics,
 but even extend their strategy to include the violent overthrow of
 existing regimes. To these radicals the end justifies the means.
 Even though both groups derive their ideological strength and argu-
 ments from the holy scriptures, depending on how one interprets their
 content, on the Muslim international front the sympathies and support
 for their cause come from different groups of countries and organiza-
 tions. Generally speaking, Libya, Iran, Syria, and the PLO support the
 umma-centered movement, while Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and the
 Rabita (an organization funded mainly by Saudi Arabia that functions to
 propagate the message of Islam throughout the world) support the
 iman-centered. While the type of support to both groups takes the form
 of finance, educational scholarships, and technological equipment, sup-
 port to the umma-centered groups goes as far as including armaments.
 The Revivalist Movement in Sri Lanka
 Islamic revivalism in Sri Lanka requires a definition. Historically, one can
 speak of a Muslim revivalist movement in that country as far back as the
 closing decades of the nineteenth century. In fact it was that movement
 that was partly responsible for the first major racial riot in Sri Lanka in
 1915. Although that particular episode has long been forgotten, the
 Muslim community in Sri Lanka has continued to preserve the essence of
 that revivalist movement-namely, the desire to safeguard the religious
 and cultural identity of Muslims. The international events of the 1970s
 discussed in the preceding section therefore did not initiate a new
 revivalist movement in Sri Lanka; instead, it added a fresh momentum to
 the already existing religious awareness of the Muslim community and
 made religion its permanent preoccupation. It is the nature of this
 preoccupation and the problems arising out of it that is termed the
 revivalist movement in Sri Lanka.
 Constrained by the smallness of their number and their scattered
 settlements, the Muslims of Sri Lanka realize that any endeavor to
 transform the entire Sri Lankan society into the Islamic ideal is a utopian
 dream. Naturally, therefore, the revivalist movement is of a conservative
 nature. All that they can hope to achieve is to make the Muslims live a
 true Islamic life and to win occasionally through spiritual persuasion
 some new converts to the faith. The tabligh movement, which has its
 headquarters in New Delhi, has been very active in the country since the
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 1960s and has attracted activists from a variety of people ranging from
 school children to businessmen, magistrates, doctors, and engineers.
 The enthusiasm and the dedication of these followers sometimes earn
 the envy of other communities, particularly the majority Buddhists. But
 this envy rarely manifests itself in open emnity towards Islam or the
 Muslims; instead, it generates criticisms of the inaction of the Buddhist
 leaders to propagate their own religion. The annual tabligh ijtima (con-
 ference) that takes place in various parts of the country, the grand 1980
 celebrations of the 1400th year of Hijra (the Prophet Muhammad's
 flight to Medina from Mecca), and the International Muslim Conferences
 held in Colombo are all in a sense the outcome of the revivalist fervor in
 Sri Lanka, and they kindle feelings of frustration among the Buddhists.
 In fact such feelings were expressed in the country's legislature soon
 after the International Muslim Cultural Conference held in Colombo in
 March 1982.
 Nevertheless, both the Buddhist community and the government,
 which recognizes only Buddhism as a state religion, have tolerated the
 activities of the Muslim activists. More significantly, the government of
 Sri Lanka has been magnanimous in acceding to several of the Muslim
 community's demands. The following are some of the facilities currently
 enjoyed by the Muslim community in Sri Lanka:
 1. If more than 50% of the total student enrollment in a government
 school consists of Muslim students, then that school is considered to be a
 Muslim school that can have a Muslim name and in which the majority of
 teachers will be Muslims. (It should be remembered that the government
 of Sri Lanka, having nationalized most of the private schools and having
 done away with the denominational system in the 1960s, continues to
 operate separate Muslim schools almost exclusively for Muslim chil-
 dren.)
 2. Muslim schools have Muslim inspectors to supervise their work.
 (During the SLFP regime of Mrs. Bandaranaike, there was even a Muslim
 Director of Education in charge of all Muslim schools.)
 3. Islam is a subject in the curriculum of all Muslim schools, and Muslim
 Civilization is a subject that can be offered at the G.C.E. Ordinary Level
 and Advanced Level examinations. Arabic is another subject taught in all
 Muslim schools.
 4. Even though all Muslim schools have opted for Tamil as the medium
 of instruction, in teaching Tamil literature they have excluded from use
 all the famous Tamil texts in preference to those written by Muslims with
 an Islamic content. The reason for this exclusion is that the popular
 Tamil texts have a Hindu content.
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 5. The Muslims have requested and have obtained the government's
 authority to keep their children, especially the girls, from studying
 subjects such as music, art, dancing, and sculpture. The reason given is
 that these subjects could lead Muslim children astray.
 6. All Muslim schools have a separate calendar that enables them to have
 their term holidays during periods of religious importance. For example,
 all Muslim schools remain closed during the fasting month of Ramadhan.
 7. The Sri Lankan National Radio Service has allocated at least an hour a
 day for the exclusive use of the Muslims-a facility not enjoyed by
 nearly 100 million Muslims in India.
 From this sample of facilities, it may appear that the government of Sri
 Lanka is genuinely concerned with the spiritual development of the
 Muslim community. The Muslim leaders in the country even cite these
 facilities as the index of Muslim cultural welfare in Sri Lanka. But there
 are other and more important reasons for the government's generosity
 and concern towards the Muslims. Attention was drawn earlier in this
 article to the state of Sri Lanka's economy. With the increase in oil prices
 and the resulting affluence of the Muslim Middle East, Sri Lanka has tried
 to earn the friendship of the Arab countries to gain some economic
 advantage. The closure of the Israeli embassy and the appointment of a
 Muslim as the Minister of Education during the SLFP regime (1970-77),
 and the appointment of a Muslim as the Minister of Foreign Affairs by
 the ruling UNP were all aimed at presenting an appropriate image to the
 Arab nations. The publicity and the extraordinary reception accorded to
 the Arab leaders during the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo in
 1976 were also intended to advance this image. The government's fa-
 vored treatment of the Muslims in Sri Lanka is thus a part of this strategy
 to win Arab favors. This approach has yielded three types of economic
 return: bilateral aid from Arab nations, a sizable export market for Sri
 Lankan products in the Middle East, and job opportunities for tens of
 thousands of Sri Lankans in that part of the world. According to the
 provisional figures supplied by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for 1980,
 the Arab countries contributed a total of Rs. 317 million to the country's
 foreign assistance receipts that year. The Middle East, including Libya,
 accounts for more than 50% of Sri Lanka's tea exports both in terms of
 volume and value. According to the same source, between 1978 and
 1980 nearly 75,000 Sri Lankans migrated in search of employment
 abroad, and of these the majority went to the Middle East.5
 5. Review of the Economy, Central Bank of Ceylon, 1980.
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 In addition, there are internal political reasons why the government is
 so generous towards the Muslim community. These arise out of the
 ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka. The
 position of the Tamil United Front (TULF) that it speaks for all the
 Tamil-speaking people of Sri Lanka is discredited by the refusal of the
 Muslim community, whose members also speak Tamil as their mother
 tongue, to join the party's ranks. In fact, the strength of the TULF would
 be greatly enhanced if the Muslims who live in the Eastern Province and
 who form nearly one-third of the island's Muslim population were to join
 the TULF. Thus, while the Sinhalese political parties try to keep the
 Muslims within the Sinhalese camp, the Muslims have come to realize
 that by playing politics between the two major communities and between
 major parties they can achieve maximum benefits.
 Finally, the nonpolitical nature of the Muslim religious ferment in
 Sri Lanka has led the ruling governments to extend not only their
 toleration but also their support. From the government's point of view,
 the Muslims are not engaged in any organized political activity; they do
 not put forward any hard demands and all they ask for is the freedom to
 educate their children in the way they want, to practice their religion
 wherever they live, and to earn their living through their own enterprise
 and effort. To a government that believes in the capitalist philosophy, no
 community can give less trouble than the Muslims. By tolerating the
 Muslims and keeping them satisfied, the government stands to gain
 politically and the country economically. Muslim revivalism in Sri Lanka
 thus operates in harmony within the country's environment.
 But there is a dilemma. It is a dilemma confronting not the govern-
 ment of Sri Lanka or the country but the Muslim community itself. It
 arises out of the shortsightedness of the revivalist movement and the
 generosity of the Sri Lankan government. The Muslim community has
 overplayed its religious enthusiasm by giving a religious color to all its
 activities, and it is ignoring long-term dangers in favor of short-term
 advantages. Consider, for example, the curriculum of the Muslim
 schools. The language policy of the country dictates that children should
 study in their mother tongue-i.e., either Sinhalese or Tamil. To a
 Sinhalese or a Tamil child, the choice is simple. They study in one of those
 languages and choose English as their second language in order to further
 their higher education and take advantage of future job opportunities.
 But to a Muslim child that choice is not so simple. Since the Muslims
 have openly opted to study Sinhalese as well as their mother tongue, and
 since the Islamic fervor dictates that Arabic should also be studied, all
 Muslim children learn three languages in their schools; when the desire
 to study English is added the total becomes four. It is not uncommon to
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 see children in Muslim primary schools spending more than half their
 school hours studying languages. In addition, Islam is also taught as a
 separate subject. One can easily imagine the problems this creates in the
 intellectual development of a Muslim child. At a mid-1982 Muslim
 educational conference in Colombo, some Muslim leaders expressed
 their concern over the low admission rate of Muslim students to
 Sri Lankan universities. They seemed to imply that there was open
 discrimination by the Education authorities to shut out Muslims from the
 universities. But when one considers the curriculum in Muslim schools,
 one is not surprised at the high rate of failure of the Muslim students in
 the university entrance examination. The Muslims are solely to be
 blamed for this sad consequence.
 A further shortcoming has to do with the Muslim school calendar.
 Since the "fasting" month comes at varying periods each year, Muslim
 schools remain closed for their holidays accordingly. It so happens al-
 most every year that when the majority of schools in the island are open,
 the Muslim schools are closed, and vice versa. This creates a major
 administrative problem since the Education Department functions to suit
 the needs of the majority of schools and thereby the needs of the Muslim
 schools tend to be neglected. Muslim teachers often lose the oppor-
 tunities to participate in teacher refresher courses generally conducted
 during school holidays by the Education Department. Likewise, Muslim
 teachers also miss opportunities to earn additional income by supervising
 and proctoring at public examinations, which are also held during school
 holidays. To overcome this disadvantage, the government decided to
 close all schools during the examination weeks. But the Muslim schools
 will have to make up the loss of school hours by conducting classes on
 Saturdays. School discipline, administration, and teaching content all
 stand to suffer simply because of the Muslim desire to close their schools
 during Ramadhan. Whether this is the correct way of observing the fast
 or not does not matter here. What matters from the point of view of this
 discussion is that the Muslims ask something from the government in the
 name of their religion, and that the government, without seriously con-
 sidering whether that particular demand is in the true spirit of Islam or
 not, or whether it is to the real advantage of the community, readily
 grants it. All the government wants are Muslim votes with which to win
 the next election and the community's contentment to be put on display
 to the outside world. And it appears that the current Islamic trend in Sri
 Lanka operates to the long-term detriment of the Muslim community in
 that island, not to its advantage.
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 The Malaysian Islamic Revival
 Malaysia is a country with a shaky religious balance. As mentioned earlier
 it is difficult to get a clear picture of the religious distribution of its
 population. However, from the proselytizing activities of Perkim, a
 Muslim welfare organization estimated to have converted nearly
 160,000 Malaysians to Islam since independence, and from the attitude
 of the Malaysian government, which willingly accommodated 120,000
 Muslim refugees from the Philippines and another 3,000 such refugees
 from Kampuchea (while threatening to "shoot. . . on sight" any refugees
 from Vietnam6 simply because they are not Muslims), one can visualize
 the government's desperation to raise the Muslim ratio in the population
 to a substantial height. Sri Lanka made Buddhism the state religion
 because more than 65% of its population are Buddhists, but Malaysia
 has made Islam its state religion with a Muslim population of between
 44% and 54%.
 The importance of this population balance between the Muslims and
 non-Muslims in Malaysia cannot be underrated since it acts as a powerful
 impetus to the growth and development of Islamic organizations in that
 country. Moreover, Malaysia has a need to increase its Muslim majority,
 and there is a danger of losing some existing Muslims to other religions
 or isms if the spirit of Islam is allowed to fade away. Thus the govern-
 ment itself has established organizations that are involved in missionary
 activities. Perkim and the Yayasan Dakwah Islamiyah Malaysia are the
 more important of such organizations. Before independence in 1957,
 there were no dakwah groups in Malaysia except individual preachers.
 The first known dakwah group appears to be the Badan Dakwah ar-
 Rahmaniyyah formed in 1963 by some students and intellectuals.7 Since
 then such groups have mushroomed all over Malaysia, and their activities
 have extended from passive preaching to active and violent politics. The
 Islamic fervor in Malaysia, unlike in Sri Lanka, seems to have been
 initiated by the government.
 Once the government had set the tune, it was left to the citizens to
 write the song. The Islamization of the Malays gradually led to the
 growth of fundamentalism in Malaysia. The activities of four organi-
 zations deserve consideration in this context. The first two are the Darul
 Arqam and the Tabligh. Darul Arqam, based in Trengganu, conducts
 regular classes for the young and for adults, and its supporters wear green
 6. Judith Strauch, "Malaysia's Response to the Boat People: The Ethnic Factor," South-
 east Asia Chronicle, April 1980. In fact, quite large members of non-Muslim refugees from
 Vietnam were allowed entry into Malaysia.
 7. Asia Week, August 1, 1980.
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 robes and turbans. It is reported that they encourage their members to
 throw away their television sets and not even to sit in chairs.8 The
 Tabligh, as in Sri Lanka, has its headquarters in New Delhi and is quite
 powerful among the Indian Muslims in Malaysia. Its members wear white
 robes and turbans and are generally withdrawn from day-to-day life.9
 These two groups are considered extremely fanatical about their beliefs
 and were held responsible for the temple breaking incident in 1978 at
 Kerling in Kuala Lumpur that led to the death of four. Some of them
 were even reported to have been involved in desecrating 28 Hindu
 temples in Peninsular Malaysia.10
 The third group is the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), the
 Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, under its charismatic leader
 Anwar Ibrahim. This movement is estimated to have a membership of
 between 30,000 and 50,000 young Malays including university students.
 Its leader was arrested and jailed in 1974 for participating in the student
 demonstrations organized in support of the peasants in Baling who
 complained about their economic hardships.1" Even though ABIM is
 anti-Marxist, its ideology demonstrates a mixture of Islam and Marxism.
 "We think," said Ibrahim, "that Islam should be viewed as a means of
 salving the evils in society-corruption, exploitations of the poor and so
 on.... To be fundamentalist doesn't mean to be antagonistic."'12 ABIM
 also has outside connections, especially with Gadaffi's Libya.
 The fourth group is a fundamentalist political party, the Pan Malay
 Islamic Party (PAS), under the leadership of Haji Mohamed Asri. This
 party is particularly powerful in the states of Trengganu, Kedah, Kelalan-
 tan, and Pahang. The 1978 election manifesto of this party emphasized
 "the role that Islam should play in the country, the sovereignty of the
 Malay rulers, the guarantee of bumiputra political powers in the constitu-
 tion and the need to replace the current Western-oriented judicial sys-
 tem with Islamic laws." 13 Asri, in his introduction, described the man-
 ifesto as "our struggle, which spelt out a heavy responsibility to save our
 religion, nation and country from falling into the canyon of destruction
 and from breaking into pieces on deadly rocks. "'4
 8. Rodney Tasker, "The Explosive Mix of Muhammad and Modernity," Far Eastern
 Economic Review, February 9, 1978.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Ibid.
 1 1. Ibid.
 12. Ibid. Also, Asiaweek, August 1, 1980.
 13. Harold Crouch, Lee Kann Hing, and Michael Ong, Malaysian Politics and the 1978
 Election (Kuala Lumpur, 1980), p. 89.
 14. Ibid.
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 Of these four groups, the first two are overtly fanatical in their spiritual
 convictions, and they seem to attach only secondary importance to more
 mundane affairs of life. They are religious zealots with a crusading spirit.
 But the latter two are a mixture of religion and politics. There are a
 number of other dakwah groups that may fall under either category, but a
 discussion of them will only add details and therefore can be omitted.
 Given the context of the Malaysian political, economic, and social
 environment, what are the problems these two groups create, particu-
 larly for the government in power? How does the government respond
 to their challenge? To answer these questions, another crucial variable in
 the Malaysian political structure needs to be examined, the New Eco-
 nomic Policy (NEP) introduced by the Malaysian government soon after
 the racial riots (Malay vs. Chinese) of May 1969. Just after these riots,
 Mohamad Mahathir, the present Prime Minister of Malaysia, published
 his Malay Dilemma, which aimed "to identify and analyze the . . . causes
 which contributed towards putting the Malays in the peculiar position
 in which they" found themselves.15 "If no impediment at all is placed in
 the way of total Chinese domination of the economy of Malaysia," he
 wrote, "the country would certainly be prosperous. The Malay dilemma
 is whether they should be proud to be the poor citizens of a prosperous
 country or whether they should try to get at some of the riches that this
 country boasts of, even if it blurs the economic picture of Malaysia a
 little." 16 The NEP, introduced in 1970, was in a sense designed to solve
 this dilemma. The policy was aimed at giving the Malays at least 30% of
 all the employment and assets in the country within twenty years. In spite
 of the country's commitment to a free enterprise economy, the NEP has
 increased the role of the government in economic affairs, much to the
 resentment of the Indians and Chinese. The NEP was the answer to
 Mahathir's call to the Malays "to assert their rights and arrogate to
 themselves what they consider to be theirs."'17 There are only six years
 left for the NEP to fulfill its targets, and already it is lagging behind. In
 fact the economic feasibility of the NEP targets has been questioned by
 several experts.18
 The government's commitment to the NEP and the fear of a repetition
 of May 1969 are two factors that influence its reaction to Islamic re-
 vivalism in Malaysia. If revivalism of the al-Arqam and Tabligh models
 15. Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, P. 3.
 16. Ibid., p. 61.
 17. Ibid., p. 3.
 18. Donald R. Snodgrass, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia (New York:
 Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 279.
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 turn the people's attention away from this life towards the hereafter,
 particularly at a time when they should work harder to achieve
 government-set targets, it will eventuate in a backward turn to pre-1969
 days. This view has been expresed publicly by government authorities.
 Hussain Onn, the former Prime Minister, said in describing these
 backward-looking revivalists that Islam has been "misinterpreted and
 exploited by ill-informed, misguided and unscrupulous people."19 While
 Mahathir is calling on the Malays to look East to Taiwan, South Korea,
 and Singapore,20 the revivalists are teaching them to look towards the
 heaven and the sky. Naturally, the government is viewing this brand of
 religious revivalism as unpatriotic and as a force for sabotage.
 But the challenge posed by the PAS and the ABIM are of a different
 sort. Since they are political groups with an Islamic color, the govern-
 ment views them primarily as political enemies. In the 1978 general
 elections, the PAS captured five seats in the National Parliament with
 15.5% of the total number of valid votes polled, and in the 1982
 elections it maintained the same number of seats but increased its per-
 centage of total valid votes to 16.4%. In the state legislatures, although
 its seats were reduced from 43 in 1974 to 11 in 1978, it increased
 that number to 18 in 1982. And even though Asri lost his own seat,
 his party is still a challenge to the ruling National Front Coalition headed
 by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). "This five year
 term will give us more chances for a bigger come back," said Asri. "We
 should not look at PAS as a former ruling party, but as an underdog
 which within a short period should be able to play the role of a healthy
 opposition. The battle has just begun."'21
 The PAS fights its election on the platform of religion and culture.
 Realizing the potential appeal that religion will have for voters, the
 UMNO is forced to counter the PAS propaganda with an equally
 religious-oriented campaign. The UMNO leaders had to prove to the
 public that the PAS accusation that its members are unislamic is totally
 false. One way of doing this is to show publicly an increasing interest in
 religion. Hussain Onn aptly summed up the government's dilemma in
 the following words: "You may wonder why we spend so much money
 on Islam. You may think it is a waste of money. If we don't we face two
 major problems. First, Party Islam will get at us. The party will, and does
 claim we are not religious and the people will lose faith. Second, we have
 to strengthen the faith of the people, which is another way to fight against
 19. Rodney Tasker, "Explosive Mix."
 20. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9, 1982.
 21. Asiaweek, May 7, 1982.
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 communist ideology."22 The political fight between the PAS and UMNO
 at home indirectly adds strength to the fervor of Islamic revivalism.
 Just as the government fears losing votes to the PAS, so also it sees the
 danger of possible youth unrest and an eventual breakdown of racial
 harmony if the activities of the ABIM were to go unchecked. In the
 1970s the government suspected that ABIM had links both with the
 radical forces abroad and the PAS at home. And the government was
 taken aback by an event in 1980 in which a group of extremists attacked a
 police station in Batu Pahat and caused 23 deaths. ABIM was not
 involved in this incident, but it signaled the direction in which the
 religious and radical forces were moving in the country. The government
 soon began to make its moves. ABIM's activities were closely screened,
 and it was asked to dissociate itself from all external connections. All
 dakwah groups and other societies were required to register themselves
 with the Registrar of Societies, and their activities came under thorough
 scrutiny. Above all, by labeling the religious opponents as "de-
 viationists," the government tactfully sanctioned only those religious
 activities permitted by the National Council of Islamic Affairs-a body
 consisting of theologians and religious leaders from various states in
 Malaysia all chosen by the government. Whether the government's in-
 terpretation of religious issues is the true Islamic version and whether its
 view on a particular issue will provoke opposition from other Muslim
 countries did not matter. Unlike Sri Lanka, Malaysia is not a poor
 country dependent on external support for its economic survival, and
 therefore the reaction of the Arab countries to Malaysian decisions on
 religious affairs is not a matter of great concern to the Malaysian gov-
 ernment.
 These several measures adopted by the government appear to have
 made some breakthrough in the attempt to contain religious ferment. A
 notable achievement in this respect is the joining of ABIM with the
 UMNO-led National Front coalition. They fought together in the gen-
 eral elections of 1982 against the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and
 the PAS, securing a total of 132 of the 154 seats in the national parlia-
 ment, and Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of the ABIM, was appointed as a
 Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's department. Before the elec-
 tions the government's opinion about ABIM was that it was a group of
 deviationists, extremists, and fanatics, but after the elections, ABIM has
 become a group of "misled" youths and "at the very least, did not know
 what they did."23 How long this honeymoon between the UMNO and
 22. Rodney Tasker, "Explosive Mix."
 23. Asiaweek, May 7, 1982.
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 ABIM will continue is anyone's guess. But it is reasonable to predict that
 any disenchantment between the two will enhance the popularity of
 PAS, the other fundamentalist political group.
 Apart from internal political and ethnic problems, there is also an
 external factor that makes revivalism in Malaysia a sensitive issue. This
 point raises an interesting contrast between the situation in Sri Lanka and
 that in Malaysia. Throughout history Sri Lanka has been at the receiving
 end of events happening outside its shores. It responds to the challenges
 and shocks generated from outside, rather than producing any from
 inside. Its proximity to India, its small size, and the relative insignificance
 of its economy to the outside world may have determined this one-way
 phenomenon. It is logical, therefore, that the Islamic revivalism in Sri
 Lanka should also have had hardly any impact on the Muslims outside the
 island. But Malaysia is a different case. Its economic resources and
 strategic location-e.g., astride the Straits of Malacca-have given it a
 status of great geopolitical and economic significance within the South-
 east Asian region. It is also, in addition, a leading member of the
 Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Given that it has a
 Muslim-dominated government and Islam is its state religion, and that
 over 55% of the ASEAN population are Muslims, it is no surprise that
 Malaysia should be looked upon as an epicenter of Islamic activities in
 the ASEAN region. The fate of Islamic revivalism in that country will
 therefore be felt within the ASEAN circle.
 In neighboring Indonesia the Muslim United Development Party
 (PPP), a conglomeration of all the Islamic groups created by Suharto in
 1977 in order to control them, was defeated by the government-backed
 Golkar party in the May 1982 general elections and is placed in the same
 position as the PAS in Malaysia.24 While the PAS was able to capture
 only a little more than 15% of the votes in Malaysia, the PPP in
 Indonesia won 28% in that country.25 Nevertheless, both parties have
 more or less the same objectives and both are in close touch with each
 other. The governments of both countries are aware of the potential
 threat posed by their opponents, and naturally those governments are
 monitoring their rivals' activities. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that
 a change of fortunes away from any of the governments towards its
 respective opposition is bound to enhance the strength of the rival of its
 counterpart.
 The Pattani Muslim separatist movement in Thailand has also brought
 Islam into political conflict in order to win support from Muslim coun-
 24. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1982.
 25. Ibid.
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 tries and organizations. In relation to Malaysia, given that the Pattanis are
 of Malay origin, that their guerrillas operate in the Thai-Malaysian bor-
 der jungles, and that the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
 has links with the Malayan Peoples Liberation Army (MPLA), the mili-
 tary wing of the banned Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), the
 Thai-Malaysian border problem is a complex one. The PULO appears to
 have mustered some support in Kelantan, a stronghold of the Malaysian
 PAS and other fanatical groups.26 It thus becomes obvious that the
 success of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia will cause the Thai au-
 thorities great concern and may even strain Thai-Malaysian relationships.
 The Malaysian government is aware of this and this explains why at the
 1977 Islamic foreign ministers conference at Tripoli, Malaysia joined
 Indonesia in preventing representation at the conference of Muslims
 from Thailand.27
 The Moro problem is another issue that is political in essence but
 religious in appearance. Malaysian sympathy towards the Moros was
 demonstrated by the earlier reference in this article to the 120,000
 Muslim refugees from the Philippines who were given asylum in
 Malaysia. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Bangsa
 Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) receive aid from several Muslim
 sources including Malaysia, and "until 1975, arms and aid came through
 Sabah, and Tun Mustapha Harun, the Sabah Chief Minister served as a
 conduit for outside aid before his fall from power."28 It appears that
 Harun dreamt of leading Sabah out of the Malaysian Federation and
 annexing the Southern Philippines to form a new state with himself as
 Sultan.29 The government of Malaysia, however, is extremely cautious in
 its attitude towards the Moro problem. It knows that the issue can whip
 up religious fervor and enhance the strength of the fundamentalists. This
 explains why Malaysia attempted to tone down a resolution condemning
 the Philippines on the Moro problem at the 1977 Tripoli conference.30
 Given the complex politics of the ASEAN region, Islamic fundamen-
 talism in Malaysia can become a danger to ASEAN unity. This factor
 compounds the dilemma for Malaysian authorities.
 26. Far Eastern Economic Reviewv, June 20, 1980, and October 9, 1981.
 27. Asia Year Book, 1982, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 92.
 28. Carl A. Trocki, "Islam: Threat to ASEAN Regional Unity?," Current History, April
 1980.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Asia Year Book, 1982, p. 92.
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 Conclusion
 This article aimed at analyzing the contrast between Sri Lanka and
 Malaysia with respect to the nature and problems of Islamic revivalism in
 those countries. In doing so it highlighted the significance of the eco-
 nomic, political, and demographic variables that determined this con-
 trast. The most important outcome of this exercise is the irony that
 Muslim religious fundamentalism found a harmonious environment in a
 non-Muslim country whereas it created an environment of conflict within
 a Muslim country.
 From this contrast and from the nature of the politics of Islamic
 revivalism, some generalizations can be made. For this purpose the
 nature of Islamic revivalism is summarized in Table 1.
 Depending on the strength of the Muslim population in the society
 (i.e., whether they are a ruling group or a subject group), the fortunes of
 each of the revivalist categories will vary. In both types of societies, the
 first category of revivalism will not be tolerated. It poses a threat to the
 maintenance of law and order. Had the Tabligh in Sri Lanka behaved like
 its counterpart the Darul Arqam in Malaysia and engaged in breaking
 temples, the harmonious existence of Islam in Sri Lanka would have
 come to an end long ago. The Muslims of Sri Lanka have been pragmatic
 enough, at least since 1915, not to allow their religious enthusiasm to
 become overtly aggressive. Even if the Muslims are a ruling community
 as in Malaysia, iman-centered radicalism, because of its fanaticism and
 intolerance, endangers social amity. The Malaysian government's tough
 attitude towards Al-Arqam, Tabligh, and other fanatical religious move-
 ments is therefore understandable and is based primarily upon this
 factor.
 TABLE 1 Islamic Revivalism
 Substance Image Effect
 iman-centered radical fanatical, aggressive,
 and socially intolerant
 iman-centered moderate passive, voluntary with-
 drawal, and socially
 harmless
 umma-centered radical politically militant and
 socially divisive
 umma-centered moderate politically gradualist
 and socially accommodative
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 On the other hand, if the iman-centered revivalism is moderate and
 passive and concentrates its activities within the Muslim community, it
 not only survives without any serious objections from the other com-
 munities in a multiracial society, but it may also, depending on the
 economic situation of the country, receive the blessings of the ruling
 government. The Sri Lankan case demonstrates this point very well. It
 may appear that this particular point is valid only in countries like Sri
 Lanka where the Muslims are a minority, but that is not necessarily so.
 Even in a Muslim majority country, if an organized movement can
 consciously and successfully divert the attention of the masses away from
 the affairs of this world and towards those of the "other world," then at
 least from the point of view of the interests of the ruling classes that
 movement will be performing a worthy function. It will be interesting to
 examine this hypothesis in the context of the state's attitude towards
 religion in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. However, if the
 government in power is genuinely interested in improving the economic
 and social well-being of its people, as appears to be the case in Malaysia,
 iman-centered revivalism, even if it is moderate, will not be encouraged.
 At best it will be left to survive on its own.
 Unlike the iman-centered group, umma-centered revivalism creates
 political problems within and outside a country. It was the radical version
 of the latter that overthrew the Shah's regime in Iran and destabilized the
 international political status quo in that region. Similarly, a victory in the
 future of an umma-centered radical Islamic party in Malaysia (or In-
 donesia) will not only upset the internal class structure of the society but
 also the international political power balance in Southeast Asia. Islamic
 revivalism is therefore a source of conflict in this region. The UMNO
 and the PAS, and the Golkar and the PPP, all reflect the different sides of
 this conflict and not its ultimate solution.
